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Abstract—Modern wireless communication systems employ 
wideband modulated RF carriers to communicate the data of 
interest between the nodes in the network. The security of 
communications has been conventionally addressed in the data 
link layers through scrambling and data encryption schemes. 
These schemes however do not secure the air interface parameters 
such as modulation scheme and leave them susceptible to 
eavesdropping and interception by man-in-the-middle platforms. 
Physical layer security schemes such as directional modulation, 
DFT S OFDM and RF fingerprinting have been proposed. In this 
paper, we propose a novel physical layer encryption scheme based 
on the spectral profile of the intended modulated signal through 
deliberately introduced constellation distortion to conceal the 
modulation scheme. The scheme uses a dispersive filter in the 
modulator with unique group delay profiles unknown to the 
eavesdropper. The appropriate inverse filter is employed in the 
authorized receivers to recover the original modulated basebands 
for demodulation.  
Keywords—Physical Layer Security.   
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Modern wireless communication systems such as 5G and 
Next Generation High Throughput Satellite networks employ 
wideband vector modulated carriers having bandwidths over 60 
MHz per channel to communicate the data of interest between 
the nodes in the network. Security of communications is 
conventionally handled in the upper layers of the network stack 
with techniques such as scrambling and data encryption. These 
techniques however do no protect the air interface of the wireless 
network and therefore leave the nodes susceptible to 
eavesdropping by man-in-the-middle interceptors [1,2]. 
Physical layer security schemes such as directional modulation, 
RF fingerprinting, Discrete Fourier Transform Spread 
Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (DFT-S-OFDM) 
have been proposed in [3, 4, and 5]. [1,6] explain schemes for 
secure generation of shared encryption keys based on the quasi-
static and reciprocal nature of the wireless communication 
channel between any two authorized nodes in a wireless 
network. A physical layer security scheme based on fast hopping 
of polarizations in a satellite network is proposed in [9]. 
The hardware involved in the generation of a wideband 
modulated signal itself often requires calibration to mitigate the 
bandwidth specific impairments such as wideband ripple, tilt 
and non-linear group delay variation which in combination can 
introduce distortion in the constellation of the modulated signal.   
In this paper we propose a novel scheme to encrypt the 
physical layer by exploiting the parameter Group Delay (GD) to 
secure the physical layer and complement the published physical 
layer security schemes.  
The remainder of this paper is arranged as follows: In section 
II we describe the proposed scheme of concealing the air 
interface parameters by introducing constellation distortion in 
the modulated signal with calculated amounts of GD variation 
across the occupied bandwidth and its inverse operation at the 
authorized receiver to recover the original modulated signal. 
The experimentally measured results to validate the technique 
are presented in section III. Finally in section IV we cover the 
main conclusions from this work. 
II. THE PROPOSED SCHEME 
The generalized block diagram of a wireless transmitter is 
shown in Fig 1. The Digital Signal Processor (DSP) performs the 
task of vector modulation symbol generation, baseband filtering, 
digital up-conversion (optional), baseband filtering, 
quantization and yields the In-phase I and Quadrature Q 
components of the intended digital baseband modulated signal. 
These signal components are the applied to ‘Digital to Analogue 
converters’ (DACs) whose outputs are vector up-converted to 
the intended RF carrier frequency, amplified and transmitted. 
 
Fig 1:  Generalized Block diagram of a wireless transmitter 
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The digital data input to the transmitter is already 
encrypted/encoded in accordance with the protocols defined in 
the upper layers of the network stack. As described in section 
‘I’, the encryption in the upper layers do not conceal the air-
interface. One of the ways to reduce the probability of 
interception is to conceal the modulation parameters of the 
transmitted carrier by introducing a known amount of distortion 
in the constellation generated by means of a secret key known 
only to the authorized nodes. It is assumed that the generation 
and agreement of physical layer dependent key described in [1, 
6] have been successful.   
 One of the key parameters of the physical layer components 
that can have an adverse impact on the integrity of the 
modulation symbols transmitted is the group delay (GD) 
variation over the bandwidth of interest. Group Delay is defined 
as the rate of change of phase with angular frequency. 
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   Where  is the group delay in seconds,	 is the phase in 
radians and  is the angular frequency in radians/second. It’s a 
parameter that refers to the dispersion of the individual 
frequency components that constitute the spectrum of the 
desired modulated signal. This is a key parameter to be 
considered in the selection of RF front end filters. 
The modulation symbol generation, wave shaping and baseband 
filtering operations are handled by a DSP in most modern 
wireless communication equipment. Finite Impulse Response 
(FIR) filters are preferred in the area of digital baseband filtering 
due to the flexibility available in shaping the spectral 
characteristics. FIR filter kernels are usually designed to exhibit 
a near flat amplitude response and a linear phase response over 
the bandwidth of interest. An example of an FIR filter that meets 
this criterion in a Hamming window based truncated Sinc filter 
whose impulse response is defined by the kernel: 
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Where fc is half of the intended bandwidth of the modulated 
signal, M is the sample length of the truncated Sinc kernel, n is 
the sample number ranging from 0 to M whose value is selected 
depending upon the desired transition region between the pass 
and stop bands. The frequency response of this filter is as shown 
in Fig 2. 
Linear phase response in the band of interest would imply a 
constant GD. This could be verified mathematically by taking 
the first derivative of a straight line which would yield a constant 
equal to its slope. This refers to a non-dispersive transfer 
characteristic of the filter. This filter may be made dispersive 
enough to cause constellation distortion if ripples of suitable 
amplitudes are introduced in the phase response of the filter 
thereby making GD and its variation non-linear. Experimental 
results in [7] indicate that a significant amount of constellation 
distortion is introduced in a QPSK modulated carrier if a 
parabolic group delay variation higher than 1.15 times the 
symbol duration Ts is introduced. 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
Fig 3 Proposed Physical Layer Encryption Scheme 
 
It is proposed to exploit this impairment to our advantage in 
securing the physical layer by concealing the modulation 
scheme with the use of a dispersive filter of known GD profile 
at the transmitter and its inverse at the authorized receiver to 
recover the original modulated signal as depicted in Fig 3. The 
exact profile of GD variation used in the transmitter needs to be 
known to the receiver to undo the distortion caused and recover 
the original modulated signal and demodulate it.    
The proposed scheme of securing the physical layer by 
encryption of the modulation constellation in the transmitter and 
decrypting it in the receiver are described in the following steps. 
i) Obtain the symbol rate, occupied bandwidth (BW) 
and modulation constellation of the modulated 
carrier intended to be transmitted. 
ii) Calculate the minimum variation in GD over the 
bandwidth of interest needed to cause 
constellation distortion using the mathematical 
relation:    
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iii) Calculate the peak variation dθ123 required in the 
phase response by equating dω in equation ‘1’ to 
BW noted in step ‘i’ and using the value of GD 
obtained in step ‘ii’.  
iv)  Design an FIR filter kernel for the intended i.e. 
occupied bandwidth of the modulated signal using 
the kernel defined in equation ‘2’. 
v) Obtain the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) of the 
filter designed in step ‘iv’, extract the amplitude 
and phase values of the resulting spectrum. 
vi) Calculate the number of points occupied by the 
bandwidth of interest in the FFT plot. For 
This paper has emanated from research conducted with the financial 
support of Science Foundation Ireland (SFI) and is co-funded under the 
European Regional Development Fund under Grant Number 13/RC/2077). 
Fig 2 Spectral characteristics of a digital FIR fiilter. 
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example, if the bandwidth of the signal of interest 
is 35 MHz, generated digitally at a sample rate of 
160 MHz and if the number of points chosen for 
FFT is 512, the number of FFT points occupied by 
the signal of interest would be 128. Since FFT is a 
2 sided spectrum, half of the frequency 
components of would occupy the position from 1 
to 56 and the other half would occupy the points 
457 to 512 in the example considered. 
vii)  Design a non-linear curve having a peak value 
equal to the peak phase deviation 5678 obtained 
in step ‘ii’ with a period equal to or lesser than half 
of the number of points occupied by the bandwidth 
of interest i.e. 56 in the above example. For 
example, consider a sinusoidal phase variation of 
peak value 5678 and period 56 points. This 
could be designed in the form of a sine or a cosine 
curve. The individual values in the curve thus 
designed represent the phase offsets or deviations 
from a linear phase profile at each frequency 
component in the band of interest. For example, 
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Where n ranges from 1 to 56, dθn
 is the phase 
offset at FFT point ‘n’. Cosine function could be 
replaced by a phase randomization function for 
OFDM carriers to further reduce the probability of 
intercept by eavesdroppers.  
viii) Add the phase offsets generated in step ‘vii’ to the 
phase components of the FFT obtained in step ‘v’ 
in the band of interest i.e. FFT point numbers 1 to 
56 and 457 to 512 in the above example. 
ix) Now, obtain the Inverse Fast Fourier Transform 
(IFFT) of the modified FFT in step ‘viii’. This 
yields a kernel for a dispersive filter which could 
be convolved with the modulated baseband 
intended to be transmitted to conceal its 
modulation parameters. 
x) Invert the phase components of the modified FFT 
obtained in step ‘viii’ and obtain its IFFT. This 
yields the kernel for the recovery filter to be used 
in the receiver to undo the distortion caused in step 
‘ix’ and recover the modulated baseband. 
xi) The initial phase of the function in equation 4 may 
be shifted at predetermined intervals in accordance 
with a pre-determined and agreed pseudo random 
hop sequence generated using the location of the 
nodes and RF fingerprinting techniques described 
in [1,4 and 6].  
III. EXPERIMENTAL VALIDATION.  
An 8PSK signal was generated in accordance with DVB-S2 
standard at a symbol rate of 40 Msps, shaped with a Root Raised 
Cosine (RRC) filter of roll off factor ‘α’ of 0.2 resulting in an 
occupied bandwidth of 48 MHz. A dispersive filter was designed 
in MATLAB as described in equation 4 with a peak phase 
deviation of 10 radians. This filter was convolved with the 8PSK 
signal to cause constellation distortion to conceal the modulation 
scheme. The in-phase and quadrature parts of the resulting 
baseband signal were quantized and applied respectively to 
channels 1 and 2 of DAC 34SH84 of Texas Instruments to 
generate the analogue equivalent baseband signals. These 
analogue baseband signals were vector up-converted to Ku Band 
at a carrier frequency of 14.23 GHz. The RF front end including 
the DACs and the Ku Band up-converter were calibrated to 
mitigate the effects of parasitic amplitude ripple and tilt, group 
delay and IQ imbalance over the band of interest [8]. The 
constellation of the modulated Ku Band carrier was observed on 
a Vector Signal Analyzer (VSA) ‘FSQ’ of Rohde and Schwarz 
which was used as a reference receiver.  
i) Undistorted condition: This was the modulated 
signal constellation before application of the 
proposed encryption scheme. The screenshot of the 
8PSK constellation demodulated by the VSA is 
shown in Fig 4. The Error Vector Magnitude 
(EVM) displayed by the instrument was 4.8%. 
ii) Encrypted/Distorted condition: This was the 
condition after the proposed physical layer 
encryption scheme was applied. The constellation 
could not be identified as shown in Fig 5. 
iii) Decrypted/Recovered Condition: This was 
the condition after applying the recovery filtering to 
the signal encrypted in ‘ii’. The screenshot of the 
8PSK constellation demodulated by the VSA is 
shown in Fig 6. The Error Vector Magnitude 
(EVM) displayed by the instrument was 4.9%. This 
 
Fig 4. Demodulated constellation of the original 8PSK signal captured on 
R&S FSQ at 14.23 GHz 
 
 
Fig 5. Demodulated constellation of the physical layer encrypted 8PSK 
signal captured on R&S FSQ at 14.23 GHz 
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was done to verify that the encryption process could 
be reversed. 
No change was observed in the power spectrum or occupied 
bandwidth in all the above cases as shown in the spectrum 
comparison screenshot shown in Fig 7. The spectrum plots 
are nearly indistinguishable. 
The internal vector demodulator of the VSA was used to 
capture the demodulated vector ‘I-Q’ basebands of the original 
unmodified carrier and the encrypted carrier. The captured ‘I-
Q’ basebands were imported into MATLAB. The demodulated 
IQ basebands of the encrypted carrier were subject to recovery 
filtering and compared with the demodulated ‘I-Q’ basebands 
captured for the unmodified carrier and they indicated a close 
match as seen in the plots of Fig. 8 
IV CONCLUSION 
The proposed technique provides a low complexity viable 
scheme of encrypting the physical layer in wireless 
communication equipment. The scheme requires no additional 
RF power or bandwidth. The scheme can be used alongside any 
of the existing published physical layer security techniques to 
complement their capabilities and the scope can be expanded to 
MIMO and carrier aggregated communication schemes with 
ease.   
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Fig 6. Demodulated constellation of the physical layer decrypted 8PSK 
signal captured on R&S FSQ at 14.23 GHz 
  
 
Fig 7. Power spectrum comparison screenshot captured on R&S FSQ at 
14.23 GHz. Trace 1 (black): Original 8PSK carrier, Trace 2 (blue):  
Encrypted 8PSK carrier, Trace 3 (green): Decrypted 8PSK carrier 
 
 
 
Fig. 8 Comparison of the demodulated baseband I and Q waveforms from 
the original carrier and from the encrypted carrier after recovery with the 
decryption filter. 
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